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A Scalar Implicature (SI) arises when the use of a relatively weak sentence (e.g., some
politicians are corrupt) implies the denial of an alternative, stronger sentence (e.g., not all
politicians are corrupt). The cognitive effort associated with the processing of SIs involves
central memory resources (De Neys and Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert et al., 2011; Marty
et al., 2013). The goal of this study is to locate this previous result within the current
psycholinguistic debate, and to understand at which level of SI processing these resources
are specifically involved. Using a dual-task approach, we show that (1) tapping participant’s
memory resources interferes with the derivation of SIs, whereas (2) it does not affect
the interpretation of sentences involving similar competition mechanisms between a
sentence and potential alternatives through the use of only (e.g., only some politicians
are corrupt). We explain how these findings suggest that the central memory resources
are not involved in the core process at the source of SIs, and discuss how this difference
between SIs and only bears on recent linguistic debates on the division of labor between
grammar and pragmatics.
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INTRODUCTION
A weak sentence with a set of alternatives normally implies the
negation of the stronger alternatives. Consider for instance the
following sentence:
(1) Some politicians are corrupt.
Semantically, the quantifier some encodes a weak, lower-bound
meaning (i.e., at least two), which is logically consistent with
all. Under its literal reading, the sentence in (1) is thus com-
patible with a situation in which all politicians are corrupt. Yet,
hearers usually infer from an utterance of (1) that not all politi-
cians are corrupt, as if some was attributed a strong, doubly
bounded meaning (i.e., some but not all). Such inferences have
been referred to as Scalar Implicatures (SIs). Descriptively, the
informational contribution of (1) ends up having the following
two components:
(2) a. Some (compatible with all) politicians are corrupt.(Literal
Meaning)
b. Not all politicians are corrupt. (Scalar Implicature)
Various arguments suggest that the not-all SI in (2-b) is not deliv-
ered by the regular semantics and is not part of the literal meaning
of (1). Like other kinds of conversational implicatures, SIs are
cancelable and can be defeased in the presence of appropriate lin-
guistic cues without any infelicity arising (3-a), while the literal
meaning cannot (3-b):
(3) a. Some politicians are corrupt. In fact, all of them are.
b. Some politicians are corrupt. #In fact, none of them are.
According to the traditional view (Grice, 1975, 1989), SIs are
derived from a pragmatic reasoning about speaker’s commu-
nicative intentions. In the present case, the sentence in (1)
is in competition with the minimally different sentence All
politicians are corrupt. This alternative is entertained because
of a more basic competition between the lexical items some
and all, which belong to the same informational (or seman-
tic) scale (i.e., 〈some, all〉), that is a set of alternates ordered
on the basis of informational strength (Horn, 1972; Katzir,
2007 for a modern approach). The all-alternative is superfi-
cially comparable to the uttered sentence, in terms of struc-
ture or length for instance, but it is informationally stronger
since all Xs are Ys asymmetrically entails some Xs are Ys.
Assuming then that the speaker of (1) is trying to be coop-
erative and to say as much as she truthfully can that is
relevant to the current purposes of the exchange (follow-
ing Grice’s maxim of Quantity), the fact that she did not
utter the all-alternative gives hearers reasons to think that she
was not in a position to deliver the additional information,
plausibly because she believes that this stronger statement is
false. The negation of the all-alternative corresponds to the SI
given in (2-b)1.
1For the sake of simplicity and to make sure we will have good control of the
analysis of our examples, we will mainly focus on the implicatures generated
by the use of the quantifier some, which scalar behavior has been documented
in various languages of the world. However, scalar inferences are triggered by
numerous phrases and scales such as connectives (e.g., 〈or, and〉), modals (e.g.,
〈might, must〉) or gradable adjectives (e.g., 〈good, excellent〉) (Horn, 1972;
Hirschberg, 1991).
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SCALAR IMPLICATURES AND ONLY
We may describe SIs using a so-called exhaustivity operator, let
us call it O, which would be very close in meaning to only. In
a Gricean approach, this operator can be thought of as a pre-
compilation of the operations driven by principles of rational
cooperation and leading to the scalar inference (see Spector, 2003;
van Rooij and Schulz, 2004). The idea is that the sentence in
(4) with its SI is equivalent to the sentence with only in (5).
Accordingly, (4) with its SI could be represented as in (6). Under
this view, it is natural that O is optional and invisible, leaving
room for the literal meaning to arise.
(4) Some politicians are corrupt.
(5) Only some politicians are corrupt.
(6) O(some politicians are corrupt).
In recent years, following the so-called “grammatical” approach
to SIs advocated by Landman (2000) and Chierchia (2004), it has
been suggested that O could be a plain grammatical operator
(Fox, 2007; Chierchia et al., 2008, 2009). Under this alternative
view, the sentences in (4) and (5) are very similar since the dif-
ference between them would simply be that the optional operator
playing the role of only is covert in (4) [and made visible to the
analyst’s eyes asO in (6)]. Even though the grammatical approach
assumes that SIs are the result of a grammatical operation (as
opposed to a pragmatic reasoning), it shares various components
with the Gicean approach [see Chemla and Singh (submitted) for
discussion]. In particular, the decision to apply O or not, or to
stop at any point in the computation, is a pragmatic one under
the two accounts. The derivation of alternatives is also identical
in the two systems, involving both grammatical and pragmatic
considerations.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the theoretical
arguments for and against this grammatical move. Our results
may ultimately contribute to the debate between Gricean and
grammatical approaches to SIs (see discussion), but we will not
commit ourselves to any particular view about the status of O at
this point. We simply rely on the insightful comparison between
the implicit doubly bounded meaning of some and the explicit
doubly bounded meaning of only some to narrow down different
steps in the derivation of an SI as follows.
 The derivation of an SI involves the decision to apply O.
This decision is akin to a disambiguation decision, and it is
of a pragmatic kind in both the grammatical and Gricean
approachwe sketched above. This decisionmay come at some
cost in comparison with cases where the role of this operator
is directly played by an overt lexical item such as only. This
step constitutes therefore a noteworthy difference between (4)
and (5).
 The derivation of an SI involves a comparison between a
phrase and its alternatives. This second step may be identified
as the stage at which the SI per se is computed. At this level,
(4) and (5) are entirely similar: bothO and only make it nec-
essary to (a) identify a set of (otherwise implicit) alternatives
(e.g., all politicians are corrupt), and (b) exclude the stronger
alternatives (not all politicians are corrupt).
Table 1 | Description of the steps involved in the doubly bounded
interpretation associated with scalar items (e.g., some) and only.
SI Only
Step 1. Decision to applyO Yes No
Step 2. (a) Derivation of alternatives Yes Yes
(b) Exclusion of alternatives Yes Yes
Importantly, the existence of these two steps is uncontroversial in
the theoretical literature, beyond disagreements about the exact
nature of the processes involved in implicature generation 2. A
summary of the partial analogy between the generation of SIs and
the computation of the grammatical operator only is provided in
Table 1.
In the next section, we review previous psycholinguistic results
about SI, and show how the analogy betweenO and only can help
determine which properties of SIs are due to which step(s) of their
derivation.
THE PSYCHOLINGUISTIC PROCESSING OF SIs
Psycholinguistic studies have initially focused on distinguishing
two empirical models about how SIs are processed, a default
model and a non-default model. As shown in Table 2, both mod-
els similarly assume that the different interpretations which scalar
sentences can give rise to are generated through the following
three processing stages. First, the grammatical composition rules
determine the semantic contribution of scalar items to the lit-
eral interpretation of the sentences in which they occur (Stage
1). Next, this literal interpretation is enriched via implicature
so as to yield an interpretation that includes the strengthened
2Note, however, that the processing stage at which the decision step occurs,
as well as the psycholinguistic reality it covers, may slightly differ depending
on the view on sentence ambiguity resolution one adopts. To illustrate this
point, let us see how it can be integrated with two possible views correspond-
ing loosely to serial and parallel processing.
Following a serial parsing view, the parser is assumed to entertain only one
reading at a time. If that reading is perceived as incorrect or unsatisfying,
then it may be abandoned and the sentence is re-parsed. In the case of scalar
sentences, the decision of applyingO corresponds to the decision to look for-
ward to accessing a second reading if the literal reading is not satisfying (e.g.,
because the speaker is expected to be very cooperative). Under this view, the
decision step does not require the strengthened reading to be already available
(and the alternatives to be calculated). In response to a reviewer’s comment,
note that accessing the result of theO-application is not necessary in order to
know whether we are satisfied with the literal reading (even though, once the
result is obtained, one may still have the option of discarding this option and
look for other options).
By contrast, following a parallel parsing view, the parser entertains all possible
readings simultaneously and, as more evidence is encountered, the unin-
tended readings are eliminated leaving only the intended one. Nonetheless,
one needs to decide which set of readings to entertain. In the case of scalar sen-
tences, the decision to apply O corresponds to the decision to enlarge the set
of possible readings and generate an alternative reading to be compared to the
literal one. Expectations are therefore the same as in the previous approach. If
the memory cost occurs when deciding which alternative reading is included
in the set of candidates, then comprehenders may not add the enrichedmean-
ing in the set of candidate meanings (and therefore they will have no chance
to select that reading) if their memory resources are tapped.
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Table 2 | Processing stages assumed by the default and non-default
model.
Processing
stages
Interpretation (for some) Accessibility
Default Non-default
1. Semantic
composition
LB: some No Yes
2. Implicature
generation
DB: some (but not all) Yes Yes
3. Implicature
cancelation
LB: some (but not all) Yes Yes
LB and DB refer to lower-bound and doubly bounded, respectively.
meaning of the target scalar items (Stage 2). The enriched inter-
pretation can be finally retracted if there are linguistic—or extra-
linguistic—reasons to cancel the previously triggered implicature
(Stage 3).
However, both models crucially differ with respect to the pro-
cessing stages at which the literal interpretation is hypothesized to
be accessible to comprehenders. According to the default model,
Stage 2 is automatically applied, so that the output of Stage 1
cannot be accessed: implicatures arise upon the occurrence of
an implicature trigger, independently of context. For instance,
on hearing Some politicians are corrupt, the lower-bound mean-
ing of some gets calculated but automatically strengthened by
the negation of its stronger alternative all. As a result, access-
ing the literal interpretation requires an extra processing stage,
the canceling of the not-all implicature. By contrast, the non-
default model does not consider implicatures to be automatic
processes. It assumes rather that Stage 1 is dissociated from Stage
2 in such a way that comprehenders can in principle (i.e., depend-
ing on contextual factors) directly access the literal interpretation
as the output of Stage 1, with no need to go through Stages
2 and 3.
As Bott and Noveck (2004) noted (see also Noveck, 2001,
Noveck and Posada, 2003), these two models make distinct,
testable predictions with respect to the processing of the
lower-bound (literal) and doubly bounded (with implicature)
interpretations of scalar sentences. According to the default
model, the lower-bound interpretation should require more pro-
cessing effort than the doubly bounded interpretation, since
hearers must derive and cancel the doubly bounded interpre-
tation before accessing the lower-bound one. The non-default
model does not predict the lower-bound interpretation to nec-
essarily come at an additional processing cost, since hear-
ers can access the lower-bound interpretation at Stage 1
before deriving the doubly bounded reading. These predic-
tions have been experimentally tested for the last decade by
means of various methodologies, including inter alia response
time studies (Bott and Noveck, 2004), self-paced reading
(Breheny et al., 2006; Bergen and Grodner, 2012), visual-
world (Huang and Snedeker, 2009; Breheny et al., 2013), and
“gumball” (Degen and Tanenhaus, 2011) paradigms. Results
have been interpreted as providing convincing evidence against
the default model of SI processing: in short, the doubly
bounded reading is not accessed earlier than the lower-bound
reading3.
THE TIME COURSE OF SIs: RESPONSE TIME RESULTS
Bott and Noveck (2004) investigated in a truth-value judg-
ment task the time course of the interpretation of scalar Some-
sentences such as Some elephants are mammals, which are false
with their not-all implicatures (since all elephants are mammals),
but true under their literal meaning, i.e., without implicatures.
Bott and Noveck found that participants (native speakers of
French) took significantly more time to answer when generat-
ing doubly bounded than lower-bound interpretations, whether
they were explicitly instructed to interpret some literally (i.e.,
some or all) or pragmatically (i.e., some but not all), or whether
no specific instructions were given in this respect. They also
found that limiting the time available for responding boosted
the rate of lower-bound interpretations. These seminal results
were interpreted as providing evidence for delayed implica-
ture processing, falsifying the predictions made by the default
model.
However, more recent studies (Grodner et al., 2010, Bale et al.,
2011, Bott et al., 2012, inter alia) have discussed other possible
factors that could account for this delay, and proposed alterna-
tive explanations for the longer processing times of implicatures
relative to literal meanings. In particular, it has been suggested
that longer response times could result from a greater difficulty in
processing doubly bounded propositions, because these propo-
sitions, logically stronger than their lower-bound counterparts,
may require more complex verification strategies (e.g., proving
some but not all Xs are Ys requires finding one X that is Y and one
other X that is not Y). As Bott et al. (2012) noticed, the greater
informational complexity of doubly bounded propositions could
increase response times independently of implicature calculation,
which could blur the difference between the derivation of lower-
bound and doubly bounded interpretations. It has been argued
along these lines that proper controls with meanings equivalent
to both possible interpretations (albeit not by means of implica-
tures) are needed to distinguish the contribution of implicature
derivation and of more general proposition evaluation (Grodner
et al., 2010; Bale et al., 2011).
Following this line of research, Bott et al. (2012) compared
the doubly bounded interpretations of scalar Some-sentences
(derived via implicatures), as in Some elephants are mammals,
with Only-variants such as Only some elephants are mammals
3As a reviewer pointed out, the time course of implicature generation has
varied from one study to another [see Breheny et al. (2013) for relevant dis-
cussion]. Some studies have found that accessing the doubly-bounded reading
of “some” comes at a delay relative to the lower-bound reading (cf. Bott and
Noveck, 2004; Huang and Snedeker, 2009). These delayed effects have gen-
erally been interpreted as showing that lower-bound readings are accessed
earlier than doubly bounded readings. Nonetheless, other studies have sug-
gested that such a conclusion might be too strong (Sedivy, 2003; Degen and
Tanenhaus, 2011; Grodner and Sedivy, 2011; Breheny et al., 2013): although
implicatures may be accessed at a delay, they do not have to be. In particular,
Degen and Tanenhaus (2011) have shown that hearers are able to compute
implicatures as rapidly as literal content under the right circumstances (i.e.,
when the set of relevant natural alternatives is reduced).
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[see Breheny et al. (2006) and Bale et al. (2011) for similar
suggestions]. Their results were that the doubly bounded inter-
pretations of Some-sentences are delayed relative to those of
their Only-variants. Furthermore, participants (native speak-
ers of English) were equally successful at verifying the doubly
bounded interpretation whether it was derived via implica-
tures (i.e., Some-sentences) or semantically forced (i.e., Only-
sentences). These findings indicate that the extra processing
time observed in the generation of implicatures cannot be fully
accounted for in terms of semantic complexity differences. They
suggest rather that the additional cost required to arrive at
the enriched interpretations of scalar sentences is specific to SI
derivation, which reinforces previous evidence against the default
model of SI.
SIs AND WORKING MEMORY: DUAL TASK RESULTS
Capitalizing on Bott and Noveck (2004) paradigm and results,
De Neys and Schaeken (2007) investigated the nature of the
cost associated with SIs (see also Dieussaert et al., 2011; Marty
et al., 2013). Specifically, they tested the hypothesis that the cog-
nitive operations underlying the generation of scalar inferences
involve the central component of the working memory system,
whose executive resources are well-known to play a substan-
tial role in high-order cognition (e.g., Engle et al., 1999; Kane
and Engle, 2002; Kane et al., 2004; De Neys, 2006; De Neys
and Verschueren, 2006). Using a dual-task procedure, De Neys
and Schaeken found that participants generated significantly
less doubly bounded interpretations for scalar Some-sentences
(e.g., Some elephants are mammals) when their executive work-
ing memory resources were tapped, while the same cognitive
load did not interfere with their interpretation of equivalent
Some-sentences when SIs did not matter (e.g., Some mammals
are elephants is true no matter whether the SI is taken into
account).
Importantly, the dual task results are independent from the
processing results we mentioned before. Response times may
reveal that doubly bounded interpretations are derived later than
lower-bound interpretations, while dual-task studies may reveal
what resources are involved in the derivation of doubly bounded
interpretations, independent of when these interpretations are
derived and accessed. It is useful to illustrate the contribution
of dual task studies with the help of only sentences. (a) Assume
that the output of Step 1 (see Table 2) is not normally accessi-
ble to introspective judgments. The interpretation that does not
take into account the exclusion of alternatives is not considered
as viable when only is present, but yet it has to be derived at
some point in the computation. This situation aligns well with
the description of the default model described for SIs: Step 2must
be undertaken after Step 1. (b) Assume, however, that central
memory resources are involved at Step 2, i.e., in the derivation
of doubly bounded interpretations of only. This could be the
case for instance because Step 2 involves the derivation and com-
parison of alternatives. Assuming (a) and (b), we can see the
distinct potential contributions of dual task and response time
studies. Competing dual tasks may make the output of Step 1,
i.e., the lower-bound interpretation, accessible; response times are
unable to do so. In short, the output of Step 1 is in principle not
accessible to introspection as a plausible, final interpretation for
only sentences, but if the resources necessary to move to Step 2
are blocked, the lower-bound interpretation may become the only
one that is accessible.
The pattern of results reported in De Neys and Schaeken
(2007) suggests that the generation of an SI draws on mem-
ory resources. However, it does not determine which step in
the derivation of an SI this additional memory effort should be
attributed to, leaving open the question whether or not it is spe-
cific to SIs. Furthermore, the additional memory search necessary
to verify doubly bounded propositions could have contributed to
the extra memory resources needed to derive implicatures. That
the greater complexity of these propositions has not been found
to play a significant role in the delay of SI processing (cf. Bott
et al., 2012) does not guarantee that it does not affect the cognitive
resources needed to derive an SI in some way.
In the remainder of this article, we report on a dual-task
experiment that addresses these two issues and refines the mem-
ory effect reported in De Neys and Schaeken (2007). First, our
results provide further evidence that the memory tax incurred
to SIs reflects a cognitive cost above the cost associated with the
meaning complexity of doubly bounded sentences. Second, they
suggest that this cognitive tax is more likely to be attributed to the
decision to derive implicatures (cf. Table 1, Step 1), rather than to
the computation of implicatures per se (cf. Table 1, Step 2). We
will discuss how these results call for a closer investigation of the
extent to which a silent operator like O can be affected, like any
disambiguation decision, by pragmatic considerations. We will
also discuss how the present findings can be used as a baseline
to investigate the exact nature ofO and contribute to the debate
between the pragmatic and grammatical view on SIs.
Before going on, an important clarification is in order. There
exist different perspectives on the nature, structure and functions
of working memory, as can be seen in the diversity of theo-
ries that have been proposed (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974;
Schneider and Detweiler, 1988; Just and Carpenter, 1992; Caplan
and Waters, 1999; Cowan, 1999; Lovett et al., 1999; Baddeley
and Hitch, 2000). Specifically, some researchers have empha-
sized the unitary nature of working memory (e.g., Engle et al.,
1992, 1999; Miyake et al., 2001), whereas others have argued for
a more domain-specific view and proposed that working mem-
ory consists of multiple separable subsystems (e.g., Daneman and
Tardif, 1987; Just and Carpenter, 1992; Caplan and Waters, 1999;
MacDonald and Christiansen, 2002). As Miyake and Shah (1999)
observed, however, it is not always clear whether, despite their
apparent opposition, these different perspectives are fundamen-
tally incompatible or rather reflect differences in emphasis. The
conceptualization of central memory resources adopted in this
paper is liberally neutral with respect to this debate: it corre-
sponds to the theoretical construct commonly used in cognitive
psychology (cf. Baddeley and Hitch, 1974, 2000) to refer to the
executive resources required by the memory system for con-
trolling and coordinating the cognitive processes (e.g., retrieval
strategies, task-shifting, etc.) responsible for the storage and
manipulation of task-relevant information (visual or spatial) in
the service of accomplishing a task. The main goal of our inves-
tigation is to determine the locus of the central memory cost in
Frontiers in Psychology | Language Sciences July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 403 | 4
Marty and Chemla Working memory in scalar implicatures and only
generating the SI from “some” to “not all” by using the compar-
ison with “only.” Although the answer to this question is in large
part orthogonal to the debate between the domain-general and
the domain-specific view, we will point out in conclusion how
our findings can be connected to existing assumptions about the
structure of verbal working memory.
EXPERIMENT
This experiment relies on the dual-task study conducted by
De Neys and Schaeken (2007). It aims at comparing the rela-
tive memory demands on the derivation of the implicit doubly
bounded meaning of the genuine scalar item some and on the
computation of the explicit doubly bounded meaning of only
some. Participants were asked to perform a truth-value judgment
task à la Bott and Noveck (2004) on Some- and Only-sentences
[cf. Bott et al., 2012, see (8) and (9) below], while they simulta-
neously had to remember a visual dot pattern (see Figure 2). The
cognitive load on working memory was manipulated by varying
the complexity of the to-be-memorized pattern, so that partic-
ipants’ memory resources were either minimally busy or more
heavily tapped during the linguistic task. The rationale for this
dual task procedure is that participants should not be able to
appeal to their central memory resources for the linguistic task
in conditions where the cognitive burden is high, i.e., in condi-
tions where these resources are needed to perform the concurrent
memory task. As a result, any process that also requires these
resources should be impaired.
As we explained above, the derivation of an SI involves the fol-
lowing two steps: (1) the decision to derive the SI, and (2) more
specific processes involving the derivation and comparison of
alternatives, which processes are shared with the computation of
the meaning of only (see Table 1). If the central memory resources
are specifically required at this second step, which is at the core of
what SIs are, then they should be required similarly in the pro-
cessing of the semantic contribution of the grammatical operator
only. Following these assumptions, any difference in the process-
ing of the target Some- andOnly-sentences would suggest that the
memory effect occurs at another step of processing and, therefore,
is not specific to the derivation of SIs, but rather to the decision to
compute SIs.
PARTICIPANTS
The participants were 16 native speakers of French (9 women),
aged between 18 and 39 years, who were naive as to the purpose
of the experiment. They participated in this study on a voluntary
basis.
MATERIALS AND TASKS
Dot memory task
The memory task was a short term storage task of visual pat-
terns. These patterns consisted of a 3 × 3 matrix filled with 3
to 4 dots. As Bethell-Fox and Shepard (1988) showed, the cog-
nitive effort required to encode such visual patterns increases
with the stimulus complexity as measured, for instance, by the
number of separated pieces that it contains. For the present
study, the pattern complexity was manipulated by varying both
the number and the arrangement of dots. The matrix was filled
FIGURE 1 | Examples of dot patterns used in (A) LOW LOAD and
(B) HIGH LOAD trials.
with 3 dots aligned horizontally or vertically (“one-piece” pat-
terns) in the LOW LOAD trials, and with 4 dots arranged in three
separated pieces (“three-piece” patterns) in the HIGH LOAD tri-
als, as exemplified in Figure 1. Following Miyake et al. (2001),
the executive resources of working memory are tapped by the
storage of such 4-dot patterns; alternatively, De Neys (2006) (see
also De Neys and Verschueren, 2006) have observed that these
resources are minimally burdened by the storage of such 3-dot
patterns. To manipulate the load factor within subjects, partici-
pants were administered two blocks of trials: one block contained
LOW LOAD trials, and the other block contained HIGH LOAD
trials.
Truth value judgment task
The linguistic task presented categorical sentences and asked par-
ticipants to provide absolute truth-value judgments. Examples of
the seven types of sentences used in this task are shown in Table 3.
All the sentences were of the form “Q As are Bs,” where Q was
one of the following quantifiers: Some, Only some, All (in French:
Certains, Seulement certains, Tous)4.
A and B were sets of individuals from a list of “categories” and
“subcategories” (see Appendix). The set membership relationship
between A and B was manipulated so that the inclusion of the A
individuals in the B individuals was either Total (A ⊂ B, i.e., all
As are Bs), Partial (A ∩ B = ∅ and A ∩ not(B) = ∅, i.e., some As
4Just like its English counterpart some, the quantifier certains can syntacti-
cally combine with an NP to form (7-a) a partitive or (7-b) a non-partitive
construction:
(7) a. Certains des reptiles sont des serpents.
“Some of the reptiles are snakes.”
b. Certains reptiles sont des serpents.
“Some reptiles are snakes.”
Degen and Tanenhaus (2011) have shown that the syntactic form of the some-
NP affects the processing of SIs. In a nutshell, partitive “some of the As” has
been found to provide comprehenders with a better cue to an implicature
than non-partitive “some As”. The present paper does not address this issue.
Sentences in our experiment involved only non-partitive nominal construc-
tions as shown in (4). The non-partitive construction was equally used when
only was present (the partitive construction is also an option with only).
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Table 3 | Examples stimuli for the linguistic task.
Sentence type Example Correct
response
Some-total Some snakes are reptiles T or F
Some-partial Some reptiles are snakes T
Some-null Some snakes are flowers F
Only-total Only some snakes are reptiles F
Only-partial Only some reptiles are snakes T
Only-null Only some snakes are flowers F
All-total All snakes are reptiles T
are Bs and some As are not Bs) or Null (A ∩ B = ∅, i.e., no As
are Bs). Some-Total sentences such as (8) correspond to the critical
condition, as in Bott and Noveck (2004), because they have two
potential interpretations depending on whether an SI is derived,
and which interpretations have different truth-values5.
(8) Some snakes are reptiles.
a. Lower-bound: Some (or all) snakes are reptiles.
b. doubly bounded: Some but not all snakes are reptiles.
Basically, (8) is true under its lower-bound interpretation, but
false under its doubly bounded interpretation with its not-all
SI (since all snakes are reptiles). Hence, in a truth-value judg-
ment task, participants’ responses should indicate whether they
went through the process of deriving an SI (“false” response)
or whether they did not (“true” response). We were inter-
ested in comparing these sentences with Only-Total variants like
(9), in which the addition of the word only turns the not-
all component of the SI in (8) into a plain entailment of the
sentence:
(9) Only some snakes are reptiles.
a. Means: Some but not all snakes are reptiles.
b. Cannot mean: Some snakes (or all) are reptiles.
Contrary to Some-Total sentences, Only-Total sentences are not
ambiguous: (9) can only mean that not all snakes are reptiles.
However, similarly as for Some-Total sentences, their doubly
bounded interpretation requires the identification of a set of alter-
natives and the exclusion of stronger alternatives (see Table 1).
Participants going through this process should therefore cor-
rectly judge these sentences as being false, but in circumstances in
which this competition process is not manageable (e.g., because it
requires memory resources that are busy) participants may judge
these sentences as being true.
In addition to these target sentences, participants had
to judge control sentences that were unambiguously true
5A sentence such as “Some snakes are reptiles” should normally sound odd
because it can trigger the SI that not all snakes are reptiles, which mismatches
the piece of common knowledge that all snakes are reptiles. The oddness of
such sentences is part of the trick that originates in Bott and Noveck (2004),
and has been theoretically investigated in Magri (2009, 2011) as a diagnostic
for SIs.
(i.e., Some-Partial, Only-Partial and All-Total) or unambigu-
ously false (i.e., Some-Null and Only-Null). These sentences
were added to ensure that participants would do the task
appropriately and that the cognitive load would not inter-
fere with the understanding of unproblematic sentences in
general.
Eight lists of sentences were created using a Latin square
design, so that every subcategory (cf. Appendix) was used only
once per list. Each list was composed of 8 repetitions of the 3 Total
conditions, and 2 repetitions of the 4 other conditions, giving a
total of ((8 × 3) + (2 × 4)) = 32 sentences per list. Each partic-
ipant was presented with two distinct lists of sentences: one list
was used in the LOW LOAD trials, and the other list in the HIGH
LOAD trials.
PROCEDURE
Figure 2 illustrates the procedure. Each trial started with the brief
presentation (850ms) of a dot pattern in the center of a computer
screen. The dot pattern was then replaced by a sentence, which
remained on the computer screen until the participants provided
a truth value judgment by pressing one of two keys (1 = false, 2 =
true). Next, the participants had to reproduce the location of the
dots in an empty matrix by using a numeric keypad. At the end
of each trial, they received feedback on the quality of their pattern
reproduction.
The participants were instructed that it was essential for the
experiment to reproduce accurately the entire patterns of dots.
With respect to the linguistic task, they were asked to read sen-
tences and respond “true” or “false” according to whether the
sentences were consistent with their general knowledge. The par-
ticipants started with a short training composed of 4 complete
trials (2 LOW LOAD and 2 HIGH LOAD trials). The sentences
used for the training were unrelated to the present experimental
issue, and were simply included to help participants familiar-
ize with the display. The participants were then administered
two consecutive blocks of 32 sentences with a short break in
between. For each participant, it was pseudo-randomly deter-
mined which type of trial blocks (LOW LOAD or HIGH LOAD)
they started with. In each block, items were presented in random
order.
RESULTS
Dot memory task
A response to the memory task was counted as accurate when
the participant correctly reproduced the entire pattern of dots.
Figure 3 reports the mean accuracy to the memory task in the
LOW LOAD and HIGH LOAD trials as a function of the sen-
tence type participants were presented with for the truth-value
judgment task.
Data were analyzed using a linear mixed-effects model (bino-
mial family) predicting accuracy from Load and Sentence type.
The model included random effects for Subject and Item, and
random slopes for the interaction of the fixed effects grouped
by Subject. Nested linear model comparisons were computed
with the null model including the full random effect structure.
There was a main effect of Load [χ2(1) = 43, p < 0.0001] such
that the rate of accurate responses was significantly lower in
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FIGURE 2 | General structure of a trial.
FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracy (in %) to the dot memory task in the LOW LOAD and HIGH LOAD trials as a function of the sentence type presented in the
truth-value judgment task. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals estimated from binomial distributions.
the HIGH LOAD trials (M = 95%, CI95% [93, 97]) than in the
LOW LOAD trials (M = 74%, CI95% [69, 77]): β = 2.74, z =
4.2, p < 0.0001. No other effects or interactions were significant
(all χ2 < 5.7, ps > 0.46). This first result confirms that 4-dot
patterns were more demanding than the 3-dot patterns.
Responses to the memory task were analyzed further by
examining dot recall performances when participants responded
“false” to the target Some-Total (doubly bounded interpretations,
with SIs) and Only-Total (correct doubly bounded interpre-
tations) sentences. Data were fitted into a linear mixed-
effects model predicting accuracy from Load and Target
sentence6. Only the main effect of Load was significant
(Load: β = 3.71, z = 4, p < 0.0001; Target: β = 0.76, z =
1.49, p = 0.2; Load×Target: β = 0.91, z = 0.69, p = 0.48).
This second result ensures that there was no trade-off between
6The model also included a random effect for Subject, and random slopes for
the interaction of Load and Target grouped by Subject.
dot recall performances and truth-value judgments to target
sentences.
In subsequent analyses, trials for which participants did not
accurately reproduce the entire pattern were removed (about
15% of the trials). According to a One-Way analysis of variance
(ANOVA), the mean number of removed trials did not signifi-
cantly differ from one sentence type to another, in both LOW
LOAD and HIGH LOAD conditions (Fs < 1, ns.).
Truth-value judgment task
Response times to the truth-value judgment task were analyzed to
control for outliers. The data were approximately normally dis-
tributed for each subject and there were no obvious outliers (no
datapoint was above or below two standard deviations from each
subject’s mean). Thus, no data points were removed on the basis
of response times.
Control sentences. Table 4 reports the mean accuracy scores to
control sentences (with standard errors in parentheses).
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Performance was uniformly high, with a global mean score
of 95% (CI95% [92, 97]) in the LOW LOAD trials, and of 94%
(CI95% [90, 97]) in the HIGH LOAD trials. Responses to control
sentences were fitted into a linear mixed-effects model in a like-
lihood setting predicting accuracy from Load and Control type.
The model included Subject and Item as random effects with
random slopes for the interaction of the fixed effects grouped
by Subject. Neither main effects, nor the interaction reached sig-
nificance [Load: χ2
(1) = 2.6, p = 0.1; Control: χ2(1) = 4.86, p =
0.3, Load×Control: χ2
(1) = 0.58, p = 0.96]. These control results
confirm that participants did the task appropriately, and that
the concurrent memorization of the complex 4-dot patterns
did not interfere with their understanding of unproblematic
sentences.
Target sentences. Figure 4 displays the percentage of “false”
responses to Some-Total sentences and to Only-Total sen-
tences, i.e., the rate of doubly bounded interpretations in both
cases.
Participant’s responses were fitted into a linear mixed-effects
model that regressed the response variable against Load and
Target type. The model included Subject and Item as random
Table 4 | Mean accuracy (in %) to the control sentences in the LOW
LOAD and HIGH LOAD trials.
Sentence type LOW LOAD HIGH LOAD
Some-partial 95 (4) 90 (5)
Some-null 96 (4) 100 (0)
Only-partial 100 (0) 96 (3)
Only-null 100 (0) 94 (4)
All-total 96 (2) 91 (3)
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
FIGURE 4 | Percentage of doubly bounded interpretations (“false”
responses) to the target sentences in the LOW LOAD and HIGH LOAD
trials. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals estimated from binomial
distributions.
effects and random slopes for the interaction of the fixed effects
grouped by Subject. Nested linear model comparisons were com-
puted with the null model including the full random effect
structure. There was a main effect of Load [χ2
(1) = 7.33, p <
0.01], a main effect of Target [χ2
(1) = 19.28, p < 0.0001] and
a significant interaction between these two factors [χ2
(1) = 5.07,
p < 0.05].
Post-hoc analyses of the interaction between Load and Target
were performed using multiple comparisons of means for general
linear hypotheses (Tukey contrasts). They revealed that the Load
effect was specific to Some-Total sentences. These sentences gen-
erated a significantly lower rate of “false” responses in the HIGH
LOAD (M = 34%, CI95% [25, 44]) than in the LOW LOAD trials
(M = 54%, CI95% [46, 63]): β = −0.23, z = −3.44, p < 0.005.
Alternatively, the rate of “false” responses to Only-Total sen-
tences were about the same in both trial types: M = 72% (CI95%
[64, 79]) vs. M = 79%(CI95% [72, 87]), β = −0.01, z = −0.29,
p = 0.99.7
Hence, the present results show that working memory is
not recruited similarly in the computation of the not-all com-
ponent of meaning of sentences with only as it is recruited
in the derivation of SIs: while less doubly bounded interpre-
tations were derived for the SI-sentences under high cogni-
tive load, the concurrent memorization of the 4-dot patterns
did not substantially interfere with the interpretation of their
Only-variants.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we have discussed two possibilities for localizing
the additional memory demands associated with doubly bounded
interpretations of scalar sentences like Some snakes are reptiles.
One possibility referred to the processing step involving the deci-
sion to draw the not-all implicature beyond the basic meaning
of the implicature trigger (some or all). The other possibility was
7As suggested by a reviewer, a difference between some- and only-sentences
might be that the information is packaged differently in the two cases.
Precisely, in the case of only-sentences, the inference to the truth of the preja-
cent (i.e., the sentence without “only”) is traditionally thought to be a presup-
position (cf. Horn, 1969). Thus, unlike some-sentences, only-sentences would
background in some way the “some or all” part of their doubly-bounded read-
ing, while putting forward the at issue “not all” part. Under the hypothesis that
the memory effect is not active on foregrounded parts of meaning, the asym-
metry of the memory effect found on the “not-all” inference for the two types
of target sentences could therefore reduce to this difference. Even though such
a distinction between backgrounded and foregrounded information is subtle,
it would provide a plausible source for the difference we found. To investigate
this issue further, we ran an analysis of the memory effect on the “some or all”
part of meaning for only-sentences. That is, we compared responses to Only-
Total sentences (i.e., the “some or all” part is true but the “not all” part is false)
and to Only-Partial sentences (i.e., the “some or all” part is false but the “not
all” is true). We found amain effect of Sentence [χ2
(1) = 17, p < 0.0001] such
that participants performed worse on Only-Total than on Only-Partial sen-
tences. However, neither the main effect of Load, nor the interaction between
Sentence and Load were significant (allχ2 < 0.13, ns). These results show that
the asymmetry between some- and only-sentences cannot be simply attributed
to the fact that the memory task effect is reduced to backgrounded parts of
the meaning.
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that the demands are linked to the subsequent interpretative step
in which comprehenders compute the enriched, doubly bounded
interpretation (which includes the SI), that requires them to iden-
tify the relevant alternatives and deny the stronger ones(i.e., not
all). On this latter account, the demands on memory should be
equivalent when processing sentences like Only some snakes are
reptiles, whose doubly bounded interpretations are made explicit
by the presence of the overt lexical item only. To test this alter-
native, we used a dual-task paradigm similar to De Neys and
Schaeken (2007).
First, we replicated De Neys and Schaeken’s results show-
ing that implicit doubly bounded interpretations attached to the
word some come at an extra memory cost. Second, we found
no evidence for a similar memory cost in the derivation of
comparable (although explicit) doubly bounded interpretations
associated with the phrase only some. Specifically, tapping par-
ticipants’ executive resources induced a significant decrease of
not-all implicatures associated with some, and no comparable
decrease of not-all inferences associated with only. These find-
ings make two contributions. They establish that the memory
cost occurring in the processing of SIs is above that associated
with the verification of upper-bound interpretations, and has to
be attributed to semantic/pragmatic computations. Furthermore,
they suggest that the executive working memory resources are
not required at the step of processing which is at the core of
what SIs are, because this subprocess, which involves compar-
ison and falsification of stronger alternatives, is also necessary
to compute the not-all inferences associated with only. Hence,
the extra memory cost incurred to the processing of an SI is
due to the decision to derive it, rather than to its derivation
per se.
An important issue that we would like to address con-
cerns the generality of these findings: how would the present
results generalize across conversational situations? Indeed, as
most experimental investigations on semantic-pragmatic phe-
nomena, our study can be said to exhibit some level of unnat-
uralness, for example because stimulus sentences were divorced
from explicit communicative goals. Therefore, the paradigm
we used might have disfavored pragmatic, doubly bounded
interpretations, leading participants to focus instead on the
logical aspects of sentence meanings. We may thus wonder
whether the observed memory effect would get reduced—or
even disappear—in a more naturalistic conversational setting
where doubly bounded interpretations are contextually sup-
ported. As a point of comparison, researches on syntactic ambi-
guity have shown that the availability of contextual information
can influence the processing of words in sentences and facilitate
ambiguity resolution (Ferreira and Clifton, 1986; Clifton and
Ferreira, 1989; Spivey-Knowlton et al., 1993; MacDonald et al.,
1994; Trueswell and Tanenhaus, 1994; Spivey and Tanenhaus,
1998, inter alia)8. Future investigations would be needed to
determine whether such context effects can affect the weight of
8Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this parallel to us.
the memory cost observed in the processing of a SI. Precisely,
following the present results, the hypothesis would be that the
memory effect should be reduced when contextual information
facilitates the decision step, for instance by biasing comprehen-
ders to the pragmatic interpretations. Such results would further
support the idea that the processing principles that account for
ambiguity resolution are not specific to language at all, but
rather reflect general properties (e.g., properties of memory)
that are involved in non-linguistic domains such as decision
making.
From a more theoretical perspective, we discussed recent
grammatical views on SIs that have pointed towards a close anal-
ogy between overt only and a covert operator O. Our results
show that overt only and SIs behave differently in terms of mem-
ory demands. Furthermore, the fact that the complexity of a
visual memory task affects the decision to derive SIs suggests
that this stage of processing is employing domain-general exec-
utive mechanisms (Novick et al., 2005). Under the additional
plausible assumption that the processes involved in interpre-
tive processing are distinct from those involved in other verbally
mediated functions such as reasoning procedures (e.g., Caplan
and Waters, 1995, 1999; Waters and Caplan, 2001), one could
be thus tempted to go one step forward, and conclude that
the present results provide evidence against the grammatical
approach to SIs. For, the computations of a purely grammatical
exhaustivity operator should take place within the linguistic sys-
tem, and therefore not be tapping into a domain-general resource
pool. We would like, however, to invite our readers to not com-
mit themselves to such a conclusion which, according to us,
relies on a false dichotomy regarding the question of modu-
larity in the debate between the Gricean and the grammatical
approach.
Precisely, as we emphasized earlier, the Gricean picture
does not have a greater monopoly on domain-general reason-
ing procedures than the grammatical view on domain-specific
computations. Both approaches do involve interactions between
grammar and pragmatics at all relevant stages of implicature
computation. The memory cost in generating SIs may be in
fact rooted in the optionality of the O operator, that is in the
decision to apply or not the operator, and thus remains com-
patible with the grammatical view. For, the decision to apply
O is a pragmatic decision, even in a grammatical approach of
SIs (just like any disambiguation decision is pragmatic), and
it is at this pragmatic level of sentence comprehension that
the investigated memory cost seems to be observed. Thus, the
present results cannot be used to tease apart the Gricean and
the grammatical approaches, but they can be used as a base-
line for future investigations. In principle, one could investigate
whether the behavioral properties of SIs (e.g., extra processing
time, memory cost) can be reproduced with other linguistic oper-
ators that would be covert and optional, and less controversially
either syntactic or pragmatic [covert even may be such an oper-
ator, see (Heim, 1984; Krifka, 1995; Chierchia, 2006; Charnavel,
2012a,b)], and use these results to draw conclusions about the
nature ofO.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF CATEGORIES AND SUBCATEGORIES
Categories and subcategories used in the linguistic task are given
in Table A1 (actual items were in French). Some-Null (e.g., Some
snakes are flowers) and Only-Null (e.g., Only some snakes are
flowers) sentences were constructed by systematically pairing sub-
categories relative to animals with (wrong) categories relative to
plants, and vice-versa.
Table A1 | Categories and subcategories used in the linguistic task
(English translation, actual items were in French).
Categories Subcategories
Flower Daisy Tulip Poppy Daffodil
Fruit Lemon Banana Strawberry Orange
Tree Poplar Fir Apple tree Beech
Vegetable Leek Spinach Broccoli Carrot
Bird Sparrow Gull Crow Parrot
Fish Trout Salmon Tuna Carp
Reptile Crocodile Snake Lizard Alligator
Insect Ant Mosquito Wasp Fly
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